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2.1  Introduction 
In the United States and many other countries, attempts have been 
made to augment the real incomes of  the poor by increasing their con- 
sumption of  housing. Such schemes have taken a number of forms, for 
example, provision of  public housing, construction subsidies, and so 
forth. It has been suggested that a better method than most might be to 
give poor people financial allowances that could be used to upgrade their 
housing standards. The success of such a program would depend upon the 
answers to several questions. Two of  the most important are: Would 
low-income families respond to financial incentives intended to increase 
their housing consumption? To the extent that they do respond, would 
housing  prices  simply  be  driven  up,  resulting  in  windfall  gains for 
landlords?’ 
To obtain answers to these important questions, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development  in  1970 authorized a social experi- 
ment ,  the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program (EHAP). The first 
part  of  EHAP, the “demand  experiment,”  was  designed to predict 
households’ responses to housing allowances. In this experiment mem- 
bers of  a random sample of  low-income  households were granted housing 
allowances and their behavior  compared  to a control group without 
allowances. The second part, the “supply experiment,” was designed to 
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1. A more fundamental question, perhaps, is why housing allowances should be con- 
sidered at all when direct income transfers would probably be preferable from the point of 
view of the poor. We will take it as given, however, that the public policy goal is to increase 
their welfare in some manner tied to housing consumption. 
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examine market effects of housing allowances. All low-income  families in 
two communities were eligible to receive allowances, and the response of 
the overall level of  prices in each community was carefully monitored. 
(The precise provisions of  the programs are discussed in greater detail 
below.) 
EHAP was not instituted in an intellectual vacuum. For years prior to 
the experiment, housing markets received considerable attention from 
economists. The purpose of  this paper is to discuss what new insights 
EHAP has provided concerning probable responses to various types of 
housing allowances. Specifically, I intend to focus on what experimental 
data have taught us  about these responses that could not have been 
learned from more traditional sources. This is admittedly a narrow focus, 
because EHAP produced a number of  “serendipitous findings that had 
nothing to do with the research objectives used to justify them” (Aaron 
1979, 48). For example, much of  value appears to have been learned 
concerning  efficient  techniques  for  administering welfare  programs. 
Nevertheless, the prediction of  behavioral responses lies at the heart of 
EHAP, and it is on the basis of  new knowledge about them that the 
experiment must be judged. 
The existence of numerous studies that have used conventional data to 
answer questions similar to those studied in EHAP  suggests a natural way 
to organize this paper. I will review the major problems that confronted 
previous investigators and for each problem discuss whether or not it has 
been mitigated by the availability of experimental data. I should empha- 
size that it is not my intention to suggest that the EHAP investigators 
were unaware of the fact that for some problems, experimental observa- 
tions offer no particular advantage. Rather, their work has shown keen 
sensitivity to the limitations of  their data. 
The demand experiment  is discussed in  section 2.2 and supply in 
section 2.3. Section 2.4 contains the conclusions. 
2.2  The Demand Experiment 
The main purpose of  the demand experiments was to obtain predic- 
tions of households’ responses to various types of housing allowances. In 
this section I shall describe the experiment’s structure and then discuss 
the problems that users of  conventional data have faced in analyzing 
housing behavior, and the extent to  which experimental data can alleviate 
these problems. 
2.2.1  Description of  the Demand Experiment 
In the demand experiment  ,2  a set of  randomly selected low-income 
households received allowances, while members of  a control group did 
2. This subsection is based upon Allen, Fitts, and Glatt (1981), especially pages 28-30. 57  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
not. There were two basic types of  allowances. Under the first, the 
payment received was the difference between the cost of  “adequate” 
housing established for the program (C)  and some fraction (b)  of house- 
hold income (Y):’ 
(1)  M=  C -  by, 
where M  is the size of  the payment. (C was determined by  a panel of 
housing experts, which considered both household size and the site in 
making its decision.) Equation  (1) is referred  to as the “housing-gap 
formula.”  Under the second scheme, known as the “percent-of-rent 
formula,” the payment was some fraction (a)  of the gross rent (R)  paid by 
the family: 
(2)  M=aR. 
Essentially, the demand experiment consisted of confronting different 
families with various values of  a,  b, and C,  and then comparing their 
housing decisions to those of the control group. In addition, some of the 
housing-gap households were told that their apartments had to satisfy 
certain minimum standards before they would be eligible for payment. 
For example, plumbing and kitchen facilities had to meet certain speci- 
fications; roofs, ceilings, and walls had to be in good repair, etc. (Fried- 
man and Weinberg 1978, A-31). 
In practice, values for b of 0.15, 0.25, and 0.35 were employed; the 
parameter a  took on values that started at 0.2 and were incremented by 
0.1 until they reached 0.6. C varied between 20 percent below and 20 
percent above the levels set by  the experts. The experiment was con- 
ducted for three years beginning in 1973 at two sites-Pittsburgh,  Penn- 
sylvania and Phoenix, Arizona. At each site about one thousand low- 
income families participated in the e~periment,~  somewhat under half of 
which were included in the control group. Only renters were eligible. 
2.2.2  Problems in Predicting the Demand Response 
to Housing Allowances 
Presumably, by appropriately comparing the responses of the control 
and treatment groups, one can infer the impact of  the various types of 
allowances upon housing behavior. However, suppose for the moment 
that experimental data were not available and that an investigator was 
asked to predict the effect that allowances would have upon housing 
behavior. Most likely the investigator would begin by  noting that the 
housing-gap formula is essentially an increase in income, and the percent- 
of-rent formula represents a change in the price of housing services from 
3. The definition of  “household income” was essentially posttax income less a $300 
4.  For example, in 1973 a Phoenix family with three or four members would be eligible 
deduction for each worker in the family. 
only if its income were less than $8,150; for Pittsburgh, the limit was $6,250. 58  Harvey S. Rosen 
some price P to (1 -  a)P.  Therefore, given income and price elasticities 
of  housing  demand, one can predict  an individual’s response  to the 
housing allowance.5  These considerations suggest the following strategy: 
Employ multiple-regression techniques (or some variant thereof) to esti- 
mate the demand for housing services, utilizing either cross-sectional or 
time-series data. This strategy yields a set of  the relevant elasticities. 
Then, assuming that people would react to the price and income differ- 
ences generated by  a housing-allowance  program  in the same way  as 
those generated “naturally,” use the elasticities to estimate the program’s 
impact on housing demand. 
I shall now discuss some problems that face the investigator who wants 
to implement this strategy and whether or not the problems are elimi- 
nated when experimental data are available. 
Specification of a Model 
Users of conventional data typically begin by specifying a model that 
relates the quantity of  housing services demanded for the ith  observation 
(QS),  to some function f(*)  of  price (Pi),  income (YJ,  and a vector of 
demographic variables Zi,  which theoretical considerations suggest might 
be relevant: 
(3) 
In some casesf(.) is specified in an ad hoc  but convenient form such as log 
linear (e.g., Polinsky and Ellwood 1979, Rosen 1979b), while other times 
it is derived from maximization of an explicit utility function (Abbott and 
Ashenfelter 1976). 
Equation (3) is deterministic, so the next step is to assume that even 
observations with identical right-hand-side variables may have different 
QDs because  of  random  errors. Usually,  an error term is  appended 
additively. (For an exception see King 1980.) Now, given a set of observa- 
tions on Qi,  P,, y,  and Zi  and the stochastic specification, the model’s 
parameters can be estimated using a variety of  econometric techniques. 
The parameter  estimates  can  then  be  used  to  compute  behavioral 
elasticities;6 indeed, in the case of  log-linear  demand curves, the pa- 
rameter values themselves are the elasticities. 
There are  several major drawbacks with this standard procedure. First, 
economic theory puts very few constraints on the form off(-), so the 
investigator must make an essentially ad hoc choice with respect to the 
specification of either the demand or utility function. Second, it must be 
5. This assumes that individuals’ choices are unconstrained by quality standards. 
6.  For example, the price elasticity of  demand is dfiap PIQ where P and Q are (usually) 
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assumed that f( a)  is identical across individuals.’ (When time-series data 
are used, the analogous assumption is that f(.) does not change over 
time.) Finally, and perhaps most crucially, it must be assumed that the 
fitted relationship will continue to apply when a right-hand-side variable 
for a given observation changes. For example, if  the investigator finds 
that (dQ” / dY)  (Y/  (  Q”)  is less than one, it does not imply that increasing 
a particular family’s income 10  percent will increase its housing consump- 
tion by a smaller percentage. All one  has really learned is that in the data, 
poorer families devote a larger fraction of  their income to housing than 
richer families,  ceteris paribus.  Only by assuming that poor families 
would act like the richer ones if  their incomes were increased, and vice 
versa, can one give any behavioral significance to elasticity estimates 
from regressions,s 
In contrast, the situation facing the investigator with experimental data 
appears simple. There is no need to specify f(-),  or to make possibly 
invalid behavioral assumptions. As Hausman and Wise (this volume) 
note, provided  that the experiment  is  designed  properly,  all that is 
necessary is to  compare the behavior of  individuals in different treatment 
groups with  each other, and with  the control group.  Indeed, EHAP 
investigators Friedman and Weinberg (1978) do  exactly this. In a series of 
tables they exhibit information on housing expenditures for both the 
experimental and control groups at the time of enrollment and at two 
years after enrollment (see, for example, pages 8, 13, 14, A-54, A-55). 
Interestingly, however, only a small portion of Friedman and Weinberg’s 
lengthy (and excellent) report on the demand experiment is devoted to 
discussion of  such results.’ Most of the document concerns the specifica- 
tion of models like equation (3) and their estimation with data from the 
experiment. But as Hanushek and Quigley  observe, such “regression 
estimates . . . do not arise from experimental payments of income, but 
rather from  the ‘natural’ experiment arising because ‘otherwise identical’ 
households of [e.g.] varying income are observed to have made different 
choices”  (1979b, 20). In short, the experimental nature of  the data is 
ignored, so that all the model-specification problems associated with 
conventional data must be confronted. 
7. Note that this need not imply that the elasticities be identical across individuals; such 
will be the case only for the very simple Cobb-Douglas specification. One can also specify a 
random-coefficients model, which allows for a distribution of elasticities across people. See 
Hausman and Wise (1980). 
8. This point is further developed in Mosteller and Mosteller (1979). 
9.  Friedman and Weinberg of Abt associates bring together a wealth of information on 
the demand experiment: the economic theory behind it, sample design issues, statistical 
analysis of  the data, and more. Unfortunately, no similar major report has been issued by 
the Rand Corporation for the supply experiment. 60  Harvey S.  Rosen 
Why is this the case? The main reason is the possibility that some of the 
key parameters  that govern housing behavior depend upon variables that 
can change over time. For example, there is some evidence that the price 
elasticity of  demand for housing is a function of  income (Rosen 1979a). 
Thus, to the extent the economic environment changes, the value of 
simple comparisons between control and experimental  groups will be 
diminished." In contrast, a properly estimated structural model would 
allow an investigator to deal with such a situation. 
Additional reasons are provided by Stafford's (this volume) discussion 
of  the general circumstances under which experimental results are likely 
to be more useful than those from structural models. First, there must be 
reasonable certainty that the programs examined in the experiment are 
the ones that will  eventually be considered by  policy makers. This is 
because by its nature, an experiment can generate information only about 
the  specific treatments being examined (or interpolations between them). 
Second, there must be some agreement on the relevant time horizon. 
Otherwise the experiment may not be long enough for one to observe all 
its effects upon the population. 
The application of Stafford's criteria suggests that in the case of  hous- 
ing allowances, a structural approach is required. A multitude of housing 
programs have been considered in the past (see Aaron 1972); there is no 
reason to believe that society has settled into a consensus on the particu- 
lar programs and parameters studied in EHAP. Furthermore, housing 
decisions are evidently made by families within a long-run framework, 
but the precise amount of  time required is not known. As noted below, 
the problem of estimating lag lengths is not easy in structural models, but 
at least some interesting results have been obtained. 
For all these reasons, it is almost inevitable that Friedman and Wein- 
berg, as well as other investigators using the experimental data," even- 
tually turn to  models of  the kind used in the analysis of conventional data. 
Of course, it may be the case that there are other features of experimental 
data that make such models especially useful, an issue to be discussed 
below. But in an area like housing, they do  not relieve investigators of the 
burden of constructing theoretical and statistical models. 
Definition of  Housing Services 
Given that analyses of  both experimental and conventional data re- 
quire  the  construction  of  models,  the important  question  becomes 
whether or not the experimental data better facilitate their implementa- 
10. One can rescue the experimental approach from this criticism by building income- 
price interactions into the experimental design. However, as Hausman and Wise (this 
volume) point out, the more treatment groups, the less convincing are the results, ceteris 
paribus. 
11. See, e.g., Hanushek and Quigley (1979a), Mills and Sullivan (1981), or Hausman 
and Wise (1980). 61  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
tion.  Consider, for example, the problem of  making operational the 
left-hand-side variable of the equation, “housing services.” Housing is 
intrinsically a multidimensional commodity-a  dwelling is characterized 
by  its  number  of  rooms, their  size, the quality of  construction  and 
plumbing,  etc. It is therefore very difficult to summarize in  a single 
number the quantity of  housing services generated by a given dwelling. 
Usually it is assumed that the amount of housing services is proportional 
to the rent paid, or, in the case of  an owner-occupied dwelling, to the 
value of the house. (See, e.g., Polinsky and Ellwood 1979.)  The difficulty 
here is that the rental value of  a dwelling at a given time may reflect 
characteristics of the market that have nothing to do with the quantity of 
housing services actually generated.  As  King  (1980) points  out, for 
example, the special income-tax treatment of rental income will generally 
influence market values. 
An alternative tack would be to abandon the possibility of summarizing 
housing services in a single variable, and instead to estimate a series of 
demand functions for various housing attributes. An immediate problem 
is  the absence  of  observable market  prices for attributes.  Recently, 
Witte, Sumka, and Erekson (1979) have implemented the suggestion of 
Rosen (1974) that attribute-demand equations be estimated in a two-step 
process: (1) estimate the implicit attribute prices from a hedonic price 
equation for housing,” and (2) use these prices as explanatory variables in 
regressions with attribute quantities as the dependent variables. How- 
ever, Brown and Rosen (1982) have shown that major statistical pitfalls 
are present in this procedure and that the validity of Witte, Sumka, and 
Erekson’s results is therefore in question. Although some progress is 
being made  in dealing with  these problems  (see  Quigley  1982), the 
approach that continues to predominate is the use of  rent as the single 
measure of  the quantity of  housing services. 
Do the EHAP data allow the construction of  more meaningful mea- 
sures of housing services? The simple answer is no. Friedman and Wein- 
berg,  for  example, struggle with  the problem  of  measuring housing 
services in very much the same way as users of  nonexperimental data 
(1978, 92-94).  Similarly, Hanushek and Quigley’s (1979a) analysis of 
EHAP data uses housing expenditures as the dependent variable in the 
demand equations. Experimental  data do not remove this important 
stumbling block. 
Price of  Housing Services 
Imagine  an  investigator  with  (nonexperimental)  cross-sectional 
observations on a group of renters, all of  whom come from a particular 
12. A regression of the price of a commodity R on its characteristics (a vector4  is the 
basis of an hedonic price index for the commodity.  The implicit price of the ith  characteristics 
if  dRlaX,. See Rosen (1974). 62  Harvey S. Rosen 
community. If  the housing market is competitive, it seems reasonable to 
assume that  all  individuals face the same price of  housing services. 
However, in the absence of  any price variation, it is impossible to esti- 
mate the price elasticity of demand. Investigators with conventional data 
therefore often analyze observations across cities. Of  course, the prob- 
lem of measuring intercity housing-price variation still remains. Because 
the price of  housing services is  housing expenditures divided by  the 
quantity of housing services, the above noted difficulties in measuring the 
latter are bound to create problems in measuring price. Several possible 
solutions are found in the literature. A popular approach is to estimate 
hedonic price equations for different cities and use them as the bases for a 
housing price index. However, Alexander (1975) has pointed out several 
problems with this approach. One of  the most  important is that the 
selection of  a set of  attributes to be included in the hedonic price index 
must be decided on ad hoc grounds, but the substantive implications of 
the estimates often depend upon the choice made. 
The user of EHAP data has an advantage in dealing with the problem 
of measuring price  differences across observations.  Recall that  in  a 
community the effective price of  housing facing the individual, &, is 
(4)  Pj = (1 -  aJP0 , 
where Po is the pretreatment price of housing and ai is the EHAP  subsidy 
rate (equal to zero for members of  the control group). Because of  the 
variance generated in  & by  the ai,  the fact that Po is identical across 
individuals in the community no longer precludes estimation of  a price 
response. Po can be normalized at an arbitrary value and then equation 
(4) used  as the price term.  This approach is used  by  Friedman  and 
Weinberg (1978) and Hanushek and Quigley (1980). 
A potential problem is the possibility that the before-treatment price of 
rental housing may not be constant within a city. Polinsky and Ellwood 
(1979,199) show that even if  the market is competitive, variation in land 
prices within  the  community will  lead to  differences in  the price of 
housing services.I3  However, Hanushek and Quigley (1980) argue con- 
vincingly that such differences in Po are unlikely to be of  much impor- 
tance in the EHAP samples. It seems safe to conclude, then, that the 
experimental data confer distinct benefits in estimating the price elasticity 
of demand for rental hou~ing.'~  Ironically, the price elasticity per se is 
13.  If housing services include accessibility to the work place and the usual competitive 
assumptions hold, then the before-treatment price of  housing services would be constant. 
But in this case, the dependent variable should be housing expenditures plus commuting 
costs. Note also that if  owner-occupied housing were being considered (as it is in the supply 
experiment), an additional complication would arise because the effective price of housing 
services depends upon the individual's marginal federal-income-tax rate. see Rosen (1979a) 
or King (1980). 
14. However, the value of  these benefits is lessened to the extent that the program- 
induced price reductions are perceived as transitory. 63  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
unlikely to be of much use in designing a housing-allowance  program. A 
percent-of-rent formula offers such attractive opportunities for mutually 
beneficial fraud on the part  of  landlords and renters that is hard to 
imagine it ever being implemented. 
Shift Variables 
Consider  now  the  shift  (i.e., nonprice)  variables of  equation  (3). 
Standard theoretical considerations suggest that for income, Y,  a perma- 
nent rather than annual measure should be used. Previous investigators 
have dealt with the problem of computing permanent income in various 
ways. Carliner (1973) and Rosen (1979a), analyzing longitudinal data, 
take an average of several years’ income. Polinsky and Ellwood (1979), 
using Federal Housing Administration  (FHA) data, assume that the 
FHA’s estimate of  “effective income” is a proxy for permanent income. 
Struyk (1976) uses the fitted value of  a regression of  income on a set of 
personal characteristics as his permanent-income measure.” 
Turning now to the vector 2 of  other shift variables, note that investi- 
gators with  conventional data have to make  arbitrary  decisions with 
respect  to which  ones to choose, their measurement, and how  they 
interact with the other variables. Typical candidates for inclusion are 
race, sex of  head of  household, age, number of  children, etc. 
In an experimental framework, proper randomization removes the 
need for specifying the shift variables (Hausman and Wise, this volume). 
However, to the extent that structural models are required to obtain 
useful results, users of EHAP data are at no particular advantage when it 
comes to choosing shift variables and defining them appropriately. For 
example, Friedman and Weinberg’s permanent-income measure (p. 54) 
is constructed using the same kind of  averaging discussed above.16  Simi- 
larly, their selection of demographic variables is made on an ad hoc basis 
(P. 81). 
Disequilibrium 
Most of  the studies using cross-sectional data to examine housing 
demand implicitly or explicitly assume that all agents are in equilibrium.” 
Were this not the case, then a regression of  housing services on price, 
income, and demographic variables could not be interpreted as a demand 
equation. On the other hand, analyses of  longitudinal and time-series 
data often allow for the possibility that at a given point in time, house- 
15. Of course, neither the necessity of using a permanent-income measure nor the types 
of  solutions just mentioned are unique to the study of housing; they appear throughout the 
literature on the estimation of  demand functions. 
16.  An additional problem arises because it is not clear how to convert the monthly 
EHAP payments, which are known to be temporary, into changes in permanent income. 
17. An important exception is the work of  King (1980), who considers rationing between 
different tenure modes in the United Kingdom. 64  Harvey S.  Rosen 
holds may not be at their long-run-equilibrium positions because adjust- 
ment costs make it prohibitively expensive to respond immediately to 
changes in  economic environment. It is usually assumed that such a 
disequilibrium is eliminated over time as households move gradually to 
their equilibrium positions (e.g., Rosen and Rosen 1980).’*  It is well- 
known that such models lack a strong choice-theoretic foundation, but a 
tractable alternative is lacking. 
The equilibrium assumption is just as crucial to the analysis of  EHAP 
data as to conventional data. Even simple comparisons of the behavior of 
the control and treatment groups are less meaningful unless both groups 
are observed in equilibrium positions. It is for this reason that Friedman 
and Weinberg (1978,71) devote a considerable amount of time to sepa- 
rate analysis of  those  households that  changed dwellings during the 
course of  the experiment-movers  are assumed more likely to be in 
equilibrium than  stayers. (This, however,  creates  an important self- 
selection problem that is discussed in the next section.) 
In  addition,  Friedman  and  Weinberg  utilize  the  typical  partial- 
adjustment model to study dynamic behavior,lg  and they find rather rapid 
adjustments in housing behavior (p. 125). Hanushek and Quigley (1979a) 
present an innovative method to estimate adjustment lags in the EHAP 
data, but their technique could just as well have been implemented using 
a conventional set of longitudinal data. Contrary to Friedman and Wein- 
berg, they find rather sluggish adjustments: only about one-fifth to one- 
third of  the gap between  desired and actual housing consumption is 
closed in each year. 
One aspect of  the EHAP makes proper  modeling of  disequilibria 
especially important. For some treatment groups, individuals were in- 
eligible for housing allowances unless their housing met certain quality 
standards.  In  other words,  individuals were constrained  to consume 
minimum amounts of certain housing attributes. To the extent that any of 
these constraints were binding, then demand functions for other attri- 
butes of  the housing bundle would depend not only on prices of  the 
attributes, but on the quantities of  the constrained attributes. Estimation 
of  attribute-demand functions in the presence of  quantity constraints is 
clearly a complicated matter. Unfortunately, given the paucity of  work 
on estimating attribute demands in the relatively simple unconstrained 
case, one cannot expect that the more complicated disequilibrium prob- 
lem will be solved soon. Such work may provide an interesting use for 
EHAP data in the future. 
18. This differs from the use of “disequilibrium”  in much macroeconomies literature, 
where  the  term refers  to a  situation  in  which  markets  fail to  clear  because  of  some 
constraint(s).  See, e.g., Barro and Grossman (1971). 
19.  Unfortunately, as Friedman and Weinberg (1978,127) note, dynamic patterns might 
be affected by the limited duration of  the experiment. 65  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
Selectivity Bias 
In recent years econometricians have devoted a substantial amount of 
effort to the study of statistical problems that arise when the sample used 
in a regression analysis is nonrandom (see Heckman 1979). It has been 
shown that if  selection into a sample is nonrandom, then, unless certain 
corrective measures are taken, parameter estimates may be inconsistent. 
For example, it is common to estimate separate demand equations for 
renters and homeowners. However, since individuals  self-select  into their 
tenure modes, the sample-selection process is not random, and inconsis- 
tent coefficients may result (Rosen 1979a). Similarly, if  separate regres- 
sions are estimated for movers and stayers, sample-selection bias is a 
threat. 
As Friedman and Weinberg (1979,130) point out, although a random 
sample of low-income households was offered enrollment in the percent- 
of-rent plans, the demand functions were estimated from a nonrandom 
subsample; thus, “households that accepted the enrollment offer, were 
verified to be within the income eligibility limit, remained in the experi- 
ment, and moved sometime between enrollment and two years after 
enrollment.” Each of these criteria introduces the possibility of  sample- 
selection bias. Of  course, users of  EHAP data can take advantage of 
various statistical techniques to determine whether or not selectivity bias 
is present, and if  so, to correct for it (Hausman and Wise, this volume). In 
experimental  data, then, selectivity bias is  not  eliminated-it  merely 
appears in new forms. 
Participation in and Perception of the Program 
To predict the aggregate response to a housing-allowance program, 
one needs to know the number of eligible families and the proportion of 
those who would choose to participate. Presumably at least rough in- 
formation on the first item could be obtained from census or similar 
figures on income distribution. It is hard to imagine how nonexperimental 
data could be used to illuminate the participation issue. Although some 
conventional data sets have information on participation rates in existing 
welfare programs (e.g., food stamps), probably one cannot reliably infer 
from that data what the patterns of  participation in  a quite different 
program would be. 
A related question concerns individuals’ perceptions of  the program. 
In order to use results from conventional data to predict the effect of 
housing allowances, one must  first of  all  assume that people  would 
understand the program. Furthermore, it must be assumed that percent- 
of-rent  and  (unconstrained) housing-gap payments  are perceived  as 
equivalent to price and income changes, respectively. Although one can 
test for rational perception of the provisions of existing welfare programs 66  Harvey S. Rosen 
(e.g., Williams 1975), there is no reason necessarily to expect such results 
to carry over to the housing-allowance case. 
With respect to both the participation and perception questions, the 
experimental data provide interesting insights, but no definite conclu- 
sions. Clearly, EHAP investigators  can observe whether or not indi- 
viduals participate  in  the experiment  and correlate participation with 
various economic and demographic variables. The main problem is that 
the results may be affected by the individuals’ knowledge that they are 
involved in an experiment, the “Hawthorne effect.” To the extent that 
people act  differently  when  they  know  that their  behavior  is  being 
observed as part of an experiment, it will confound attempts to predict 
participation under a universal regime.’O  An additional difficulty is that 
participation rates may be affected by the knowledge that the program is 
only temporary.*’ 
Friedman and Weinberg (1978) attempted direct investigation of the 
perception issue. Families in the percent-of-rent experiments were asked 
in what direction their housing allowances would move if  their rent were 
increased by  $10. Only about a half  understood  that their allowance 
would  increase.  However, when  separate demand functions for both 
those who understood and those who did not were estimated, the hypoth- 
esis that their parameters were the same could not be rejected. Friedman 
and Weinberg (1979,139) conclude that, even for persons who answered 
the question incorrectly, “their response to the allowance payment can be 
analyzed as  if  they understood.” 
A more convincing test would have been possible if there was variation 
in the pretreatment price of housing services. Suppose that the effective 
price Pi appears in logarithmic form on the right-hand side of  the demand 
equation. Note that 
lnP, = ln(1 -  a,)  + lnPoi, 
where Poi is the pretreatment price and cti is as defined above. Thus, if 
ln(1 -  ai)  and InPo, are entered separately into the regression, a natural 
way to confirm correct perception is to test whether or not their coef- 
ficients are equal. Equality would suggest that individuals perceive treat- 
ment-induced changes in price the same way as those “naturally”  in- 
duced. The advantage of  such a test is that it does not rely on a direct 
question addressed to  the participants. Unfortunately,  as noted above, in 
the EHAP  samples there is probably not enough variation in the pretreat- 
ment prices to make an attempt to calculate them worthwhile. 
20.  Of  course, Hawthorne effects can be used to bring into question the results gener- 
ated by  all social experiments. 
21.  Participation was probably also influenced by  the existence of  minimum-housing 
standards. Some critics of  EHAP have claimed greater variation in these standards would 
have provided useful information on the extent to which they influenced participation. See 
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Another way to examine the perception issue would be to compare 
parameter estimates of structural models generated by data from differ- 
ent programs in the experiment (and the control group). If  selection into 
the various groups were random and if  individuals perceive program 
parameters correctly, then the underlying behavioral parameters should 
be about the same. Of course, to the extent that the particular specifica- 
tion of  the structural model influences the results, they are rendered 
inconclusive. 
2.3  The Supply Experiment 
In most analyses of  housing demand using both conventional cross- 
sectional and EHAP data, it is assumed that the pretreatment price of 
housing is constant. In effect, each household faces a perfectly elastic 
supply of  housing services. From  an econometric point  of  view, this 
assumption is justified because each household is sufficiently small to be 
regarded as a price taker.22  However, sole reliance on such demand 
estimates to predict the overall behavioral response to housing allow- 
ances is potentially hazardous.  If  a considerable number  of  program 
participants  increase  their  demand  for  housing services, then to the 
extent the supply of  housing services to the community slopes upward, 
the pretreatment price will rise. 
Considerations such as these led to the so-called supply experiment. In 
two communities, all individuals who met certain income qualifications 
were made eligible for housing allowances. The idea was to see whether 
or not  the allowances would induce increases in  prices or any other 
important disruptions in the housing market.= 
In this section I shall summarize the provisions of  the supply experi- 
ment and then, as before, discuss whether or not EHAP data provide 
substantial improvement over those from conventional sources. As might 
be expected, many of the issues that were important on the demand side 
are also present here. Such issues therefore receive only cursory discus- 
sion. 
2.3.1 
The supply experiment began in 1973-74,  with a planned duration of 
ten years.z4  In the two sites chosen, Green Bay, Wisconsin and South 
Bend, Indiana, enrollment in the program was open to every eligible 
household. All payments were made according to the housing-gap for- 
mula, equation (l), with b, the implicit tax rate on income, set at 25 
Description of  the Supply Experiment 
22.  For many homeowners, the federal income tax generates an endogenous price for 
23.  Barnett and Lowry (1979, 10) discuss some predictions of  the market effects of 
24. This subsection is based upon Allen, Fitts, and Glatt (1981). 
housing services. 
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percent. In order to qualify for the payments, housing had to meet certain 
minimum standards. Unlike the demand experiment, homeowners as 
well as renters were allowed to participate.  Perhaps the key method- 
ological difference between the demand and supply experiments is that 
for the latter, there was no control group. 
After four years of observation at both sites, it became clear that “the 
experimental program  . . . had virtually no effect on housing prices, 
either marketwide or in the market sectors most heavily populated by 
program  participants”  (Barnett  and  Lowry  1979, 1). There  are two 
principal explanations for this phenomenon:  (1) because the income 
elasticity of  demand for housing services apparently is quite low for 
program participants (about 0.3 for renters, according to Mulford (1979, 
31),25  the housing allowance did not shift the market-demand curve very 
much; and (2) the demand changes that did take place were spread out 
over time due to adjustment lags. Since both of  these phenomena were 
observed in the demand experiment, some critics (Downs and Bradbury 
1981) have argued that the supply experiment should not have com- 
menced until the demand results were in. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
assess the benefits that the availability of  experimental data will confer 
upon future researchers of  housing supply.26 
2.3.2  Problems in Predicting the Supply Response 
to Housing Allowances 
Specification of a Model 
Investigators who want to estimate housing-supply functions generally 
begin by trying to use economic theory to specify an estimable model. A 
popular approach is to assume some housing-production function, esti- 
mate its parameters,  and use them to infer the shape of  the supply 
function.” For example, Ingram and Oron assume that housing services 
are a constant elasticity of  substitution (CES) function of  “quality cap- 
ital” and “operation inputs” (1977, 284). Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) 
also posit a CES production function, but assume that its arguments are 
land and capital. Field (n.d.) uses a transcendental logarithm production 
function with three inputs-land,  capital, and labor. Poterba eschews 
selection of a specific form for the production function, and instead starts 
by postulating a supply function that is log linear in the price of housing, 
input costs, and credit availability (1980, 10). (Of course, duality consid- 
25.  In  addition,  only  about half  the  eligible renters and 30  percent  of  the  eligible 
26.  Several researchers have used data from the supply experiment to estimate demand 
27. Given the production function and input prices, one can derive the marginal-cost 
homeowners had enrolled after four years (Allen, Fitts, and Glatt 1981). 
for housing schedules, e.g., Mulford (1979). These will not be discussed here. 
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erations suggest that one can work backward from the supply curve to the 
underlying production function.) 
The specification of the underlying technology can sometimes prede- 
termine substantive results. For example, since Ellwood and Polinsky 
assume constant returns to scale (1979,201), the implied long-run supply 
curve of  housing services is perfectly elastic, regardless of  parameter 
estimates.28  Postulating such a technology, then, guarantees the result 
that housing allowances will have no effect on the pretreatment price of 
housing, at least as long as input prices remain unchanged. The interest- 
ing questions then become: How high do  prices rise in the short run? How 
much time is required to reach long-run equilibrium? These issues are 
discussed below in the section on dynamics; they are mentioned here to 
emphasize once again the importance that model specification plays in 
analyses of  conventional data. 
The presence of the supply “experimental” data does not remove the 
necessity for some kind of modeling, particularly since there is no control 
group. Barnett, for example, provides some simple comparisons of  the 
increase in rents in the test sites relative to those in other U.S. cities 
(1979, 13). Even such relatively straightforward comparisons, however, 
require an implicit model of  the determinants of  housing costs, so that 
“other” costs can be subtracted out to find the “pure” housing-allowance 
effect. Rydell(l979) constructs a rather involved model of monopolistic 
competition in housing markets in order to assess the market impact of 
allowances. He simulates the model with experimental data, but this 
could have  been  done just  as well  with numbers from  conventional 
sources. 
Defining Housing Services and Their Price 
The problem in defining housing services and their price are of  course 
as central to supply as demand. Those studying the supply of housing with 
conventional data have made exactly the same sort of  assumptions in 
constructing their price and quantity variables. (See Poterba 1980, In- 
gram and Oron 1977, or Rothenberg 1977.) 
In this regard, the numbers generated by the supply experiment are no 
better than conventional data. Indeed, the difficulties associated with the 
multidimensional nature of housing are particularly vexing here, because 
one of EHAP’s mandates was to find out what combination of  rehabilita- 
tion of  existing units, construction of  new units, and improvement of 
neighborhood quality would be induced by  housing allowances (Allen, 
Fitts, and  Glatt  1981). To answer this question, one would need  to 
28.  The assumption of  a horizontal supply curve is quite common, e.g.,  see de Leeuw 
and Struyk (1975,lS).  Of  course, to the extent that input prices change with the size of  the 
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quantify these attributes, compute their implicit prices, and then estimate 
supply curves for each. As noted above, researchers have still not solved 
completely the problems associated with estimating demand and supply 
schedules for characteristics, and nothing about experimental data per se 
makes this task any easier. 
Shift Variables 
In a competitive model, the supply of  housing services depends not 
only upon their own price, but upon input prices as well, so these are 
important shift variables. Housing studies using conventional data face 
serious difficulties in obtaining operational measures of  housing-input 
costs. For example, Poterba (1980) uses the Boeckh index of the price of 
inputs for a new  one-family structure to measure construction costs. 
Although this index is commonly used, it is well known to be deficient 
because fixed weights are used in its computation. Ingram and Oron 
(1977) use the fuel component of the consumer price index to account for 
the price of all operating inputs, but as Rothenberg (1977) points out, it is 
not clear that this index captures all the needed information. 
With  respect  to  measuring  the  prices  of  housing  inputs,  the  ex- 
perimental data provide no particular advantage. For example, Rydell 
(1979,36) must make calculations regarding the costs of components of 
gross rent similar to those who use conventional data. It should be noted, 
however, that these computations appear to be some of  the most careful 
available. 
Disequilibrium and Dynamic Issues 
As suggested above, many models of  housing supply begin with a 
production function that exhibits constant returns to scale in the inputs. 
Given this specification, and assuming constant input prices, the long-run 
supply of  housing services is infinitely elastic. Thus, any demand shift 
induced by a housing allowance will leave unchanged the long-run price 
of  housing services. However, the question of  supply response is still 
interesting, because the production function does not indicate the length 
of  time required to reach long-run equilibrium or the path of  prices 
during the transition. To understand the supply response, it is crucial to 
model both the process of  adjustment to the new equilibrium and the 
presence of  any factors that might impede the market from achieving 
equilibrium. 
Thus, for example, in one of their models Ingram and Oron (1977,292) 
assume that the most a landlord can invest each period is limited to the 
amount of cash generated by the existing investment, even if this amount 
is insufficient to close the gap between the desired and actual housing 
stock. Poterba (1980) argues that conditions in  the credit market may 
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deposits received by savings and loan associations. Poterba also assumes 
a delayed supply response to changes in all right-hand-side variables that 
are entered in polynomial distributed lags (p. 10). 
The designers of  the supply experiment clearly were aware of  the 
importance of lags in the housing-supply  process, as witnessed by the fact 
that the experiment was given a ten-year duration (although only five 
years’ worth of data were collected). Because there was no control group, 
however, no simple comparisons can be made in order to learn how 
movements toward the final equilibrium take place. My guess is that even 
if there had been a control group (call it “South Bend Prime”), structural 
models would still be more useful than experimental comparisons for 
determining the lag structure. By the time a decade had lapsed, it is 
possible that a number of  variables that influence adjustment patterns 
would have changed, so comparisons of  South Bend and South Bend 
Price would not be very informative. 
Market Environment 
In the demand experiment it was unnecessary to study market environ- 
ment, since the key question was how micro-units reacted to exogenous 
changes in their budget constraints. But to understand overall effects, the 
question of market structure is crucial-the  impact of  the housing allo- 
wances on pretreatment price clearly will depend mutatis mutandis upon 
the degree of competitiveness in the market, the amount of  slack existing 
when the program is initiated, the extent of  housing-market segmenta- 
tion, etc. 
The standard assumption is that competition prevails. As de Leeuw 
and Struyk (1975) and Poterba (1980) note, however, even given com- 
petition, complications arise because two markets have to be equilibrated 
by the price of housing services: the market for existing houses and the 
market for new construction.  The situation is even more complicated 
when one takes into account the multiplicity of tenure modes. Each type 
of housing is traded in its own submarket, and each of these (interrelated) 
markets has a market clearing price. If  the housing market is noncompeti- 
tive, the question of  supply effects is even more difficult because of  the 
absence of a generally accepted theory of price determination. Theoreti- 
cally, one can imagine examining a group of  cities that are identical 
except for housing-market structure and comparing the results when they 
are subjected to housing allowances. (Indeed, something of  this notion 
was  behind  the selection of  Green Bay  and  South Bend  as the ex- 
perimental sites.) In practice, such a course would be prohibitively ex- 
pensive, even if  it were possible to find an appropriate group of  cities. 
Again, construction of  structural models appears to be the more viable 
methodology.  For  example, using data from the supply experiment, 
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apparent variations in market tightness by recourse to a theory of  monop- 
olistic competition. This approach is interesting, but the availability of 
experimental data provides no special advantage when it comes to testing 
its validity. 
2.4  Conclusion 
The Experimental Housing Allowance Program has generated a rich 
and valuable set of data on the housing behavior of lower-income Amer- 
icans. These data appear to have been analyzed carefully and creatively 
by the EHAP investigators, although doubtless their conclusions will be 
challenged as the numbers are studied by other  investigator^.^^ The issue 
discussed in this paper is the extent to which the experimental nature of 
these data per se enhances their value. Specifically, are the problems 
faced by investigators, who have used conventional data to predict be- 
havioral response to housing allowances, in  any way mitigated by  the 
availability of  experimental data? 
With the possible exception of  experimentally induced variations in 
housing prices, it seems that the experimental data offer no particular 
advantages. Fundamentally, this is because housing behavior is so com- 
plex and the policy environment so uncertain that simple comparisons of 
experimental and control groups are unlikely to be of  much interest. 
Rather, the data must be interpreted with the help of  theoretical and 
statistical models. Thus, if  the goal was to obtain new and improved 
estimates of  the behavioral response to housing allowances, a social 
experiment was not necessary. The money would have been better spent 
on augmenting conventional data sources.3o 
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Comment  John M. Quigley 
Introduction 
Harvey Rosen’s paper provides a compact overview of  the Housing 
Allowance Demand (HADE) and Supply (HASE) experiments; it fo- 
cuses upon the extent to which the experimental nature of the longitudi- 
nal data collected enhances their value in scientific research. The Rosen 
analysis is well written and argued, and it is hard to disagree with his 
principal conclusions. I will begain by summarizing  the conclusions  of the 
Rosen paper, perhaps emphasizing his points in a slightly different way. I 
will then extend the discussion to include several important issues that the 
author chooses to ignore. 
Rosen’s review considers six of the seventeen treatment groups in the 
demand experiment and the single treatment group that comprises the 
supply experiment. 
One of  these groups-the  unconstrained-housing-gap treatment-is 
simply a negative income tax. Imposition of  this program nationally 
would adjust individual payments to reflect the cost of  “standard” hous- 
ing in each market, a good proxy for regional variations in the cost of 
living. 
The other five HADE groups-the  percent-of-rent treatments-are 
pure price reductions of  various percentages. 
The HASE treatment is a negative-income-tax schedule offered con- 
ditional upon the physical characteristics of housing chosen by recipients. 
The principal conclusions of  the author are three: 
1. The experimental feature of  the data obtained from the HADE 
unconstrained-housing-gap treatment group provides no additional 
evidence on the income elasticity of  rental-housing demand. 
2.  The experimental features of  the data generated by  the HADE 
percent-of-rent groups “confer distinct benefits” in estimating the 
price elasticity of demand for rental housing. 
3. The data obtained from the HASE treatments provide no particular 
advantages for the analysis of housing supply. 
John M. Quigley is professor of economics and public policy, University of California, 
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The Experimental Data 
HADE  households in the unconstrained-housing-gap treatment group 
received transfers of varying amounts  of additional income according to  a 
single negative-income-tax formula for three years; households in the five 
percent-of-rent treatment groups received rent rebates of  varying frac- 
tions (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6) for the same period. A large body of 
information was initially gathered about each household and its housing 
consumption; each household was re-interviewed and an identical body 
of data was gathered after six months, after one  year, and after two years 
of  program operation. 
The Unconstrained-Housing-Gap  Treatment 
First,  consider  the problem  of  estimating  the income  elasticity  of 
housing demand. Ever since Margaret Reid’s (1962) revisionist analysis 
of the relationship between housing and income, the appropriate defini- 
tion of income has been problematic. Clearly, the choice of a particular 
dwelling unit (an owned or  a rental unit) is based upon a time horizon for 
consumption which is “long.” The  search, moving, and transactions costs 
associated with residential choices are large; presumably, these frictions 
play the same role as those associated with the purchase and sale of other 
durable goods. It is not helpful merely to state that these consumption 
choices are made on the basis of “permanent” income, at least not when 
confronting observations on individual households. 
A number of researchers have used different, plausible, but essentially 
ad hoc methods  to  compute “permanent” income from data on individual 
households so that the income elasticity of  demand can be estimated in a 
subsequent step.’ 
Consider those households receiving cash transfers; they receive thirty- 
six monthly payments after which their income reverts to its unsubsidized 
level. How is this stream to be converted into a change in permanent 
income so that it can be related to housing consumption? 
If  the problem were merely to establish the partial relationship be- 
tween  reported monthly  income and contemporaneous  housing  con- 
sumption, the body of  experimental information would suffice.z Note, 
however, that any cross section of households without any experimental 
payments would be equally adequate. 
To take housing allowances seriously as a national program, however, 
knowledge of this partial relationship would never do. Some estimate of 
the long-run effect of these payments upon the housing consumption of 
1. Many of  these are reviewed in Quigley (1979). 
2. Subject, as Rosen notes, to an assumed specification. an assumed functional form, 
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poor households is required. Ironically, in the absence of a specific theory 
of  permanent income,  observations on a particular  stream of  known 
transitory payments might be a disadvantage in estimating the permanent 
response to permanent housing  allowance^.^ 
Joseph Friedman, one of the principal Abt researchers analyzing the 
demand experiments, estimates  that the additional cost of  providing 
lifetime guarantees of  transfers to the (lucky) participants in HADE 
would  have been about $10 million  (or roughly 6 percent  of  EHAP 
program costs).4  Had these transfers been truly permanent, it would have 
been possible, at least in principle, to isolate the housing-consumption 
response to a change in permanent income. 
The Percent-of-Rent Treatments 
Second, consider the problem  of  estimating  the price  elasticity  of 
housing demand, where market observations on housing are in price- 
times-quantity units. Analysts have pooled observations on households 
across markets (SMSAs) and used SMSA housing price indexes (i.e., 
BLS  average prices)  in  regressions to estimate the price  elasticity of 
consumption, Unfortunately this procedure leads to biased estimates of 
the price-elasticity term (see Polinsky 1977 for details). Other analysts 
(Muth 1971; Polinsky and Elwood 1979) have employed an ingenious, if 
highly suspicious, method to derive unit prices for housing which vary 
within a single market. The method involves estimating the parameters of 
a housing production function (CES) and using exogenous information 
on the variation in unit prices and quantities of land to infer variations in 
unit costs, and hence output  prices, for housing. Estimated housing prices 
are then used in  a subsequent  analysis to infer the price elasticity of 
demand. 
Neither  of  these  procedures  is  very  satisfactory,  but  observations 
generated by the market do  not isolate variation in housing prices, only in 
housing expenditures. 
Thus observations generated by the HADE percent-of-rent experi- 
ment are extremely valuable. Each household faces housing prices of 
Po(l -  a),  where Po is the initial market price and a  is the fraction of rent 
forgiven by the experimental treatment. If Po, the initial price of  housing, 
is constant but unobserved,  then experimental variation  in a  permits 
estimation of  the partial relationship between housing prices and housing 
consumption. This body of experimental data is the only evidence avail- 
able that includes direct information on variations in the price of housing 
facing individual decision units. The most important problem in utilizing 
3.  At least researchers have  analyzed empirically  the problems of  inference when 
4. From a discussion of  the EHAP research design at the Brookings Conference on 
income variations arise “naturally.” 
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this information is the transitory nature of  the price reduction-rebate 
offers of  a  percent of  monthly rent are made for only thirty-six months. 
Again, for (allegedly) small additional resources, this offer could have 
been extended indefinitely. 
The Supply  Experiment 
Consider the data gathered from the supply experiment. A single 
tied-subsidy schedule is offered to each household that meets specific 
income criteria in two metropolitan areas. Detailed longitudinal observa- 
tions are gathered on a sample of dwelling units, their occupants, and the 
behavior of  their landlords. 
What information do these data provide about the supply elasticity of 
housing services? The analytical problem is to identify the impact of  an 
experimentally induced injection of demand upon the price of housing in 
the metropolitan area. To infer the effect of  housing allowances upon 
housing supply requires that the experimental treatment be isolated from 
other factors-net  inmigration, household formation, changes in input 
prices-that  affect the supply of  housing services according to some 
model or set of  maintained behavioral hypotheses. Since these factors 
operate at  the market  level, it  is  difficult to see how  any ingenious 
estimation  strategy  would  disentangle  them  when  observations  are 
gathered from only two markets. 
As Rosen reports, after four years of observing housing prices at both 
sites, there was little or no change in the relative price of housing at either 
site. From  this fact, the  HASE researchers  infer  “the experimental 
program . . . had virtually no effect on housing prices.” Perhaps. But 
suppose that the relative price of  housing had declined at either site-a 
possibility not logically excluded by  anything in the experiment. What 
inference would be drawn by the HASE analysts? 
In my view, the design of  the HASE “experiment” and the organiza- 
tion of  its principal reports makes it apparent that HASE can best be 
considered a “demonstration” from which a large body of  behavioral 
data were gathered. The operation of  a “real” housing-allowance pro- 
gram in two metropolitan areas provides a wealth of information useful in 
designing a national program, in estimating the likely administrative and 
monitoring costs, and so forth. (Some of the useful results of the demon- 
stration are noted by Aaron 1981.) 
In considering the political economy of  a housing-allowance  program, 
it is clear that if  average housing prices had risen appreciably in Green 
Bay and South Bend, a universal housing-allowance program would be 
“dead.” However, even if  housing prices had risen at the HASE sites, it 
would not have been possible to conclude that the relevant housing- 
supply curve would be inelastic if  a universal program were adopted-at 
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Znferences from Longitudinal Data 
As a body of  data on microeconomic behavior, the information gener- 
ated by the EHAP program is unprecedented. The demand experiment 
provides multiple observations on individual households receiving trans- 
fers under seventeen different subsidy schedules, as well as a control 
group of households unaffected by the program. The supply experiment 
provides a rich body of information about particular dwelling units, their 
landlords and occupants over time. No other body of  information con- 
tains longitudinal observations of  demanders and suppliers of  housing 
services within any single market. 
The unique scientific advantage of these data lies as much in its panel 
design as in its experimental emphasis. The very existence of  this rich 
body of  information raises fundamental questions about the short-run 
dynamic behavior of  economic agents. 
As noted previously, decisions about changes in housing consumption 
are subject to substantial transaction costs-the  time and out-of-pocket 
costs of  searching and evaluating alternative units, the costs of  moving 
household possessions, and the psychic costs of  relocation.  All these 
factors suggest that the quantity of  housing services consumed by  any 
household at any instant may deviate substantially from its “equilibrium” 
level-at  least if  equilibrium is  defined as the quantity  chosen given 
current prices, demographic characteristics, and income. 
The concept of permanent income as applied to housing consumption 
is consistent with the instanteous “disequilibrium” between the current 
consumption and the current characteristics of  households in the local 
market. 
Theory says very little about the magnitude of  adjustment lags in this 
(or any other) market or about the pattern of  dynamic adjustment to 
changed circumstances. The dynamics of  microbehavior in this market 
are, however, of  real importance in interpreting the experiments and in 
evaluating their results. 
Consider the percent-of-rent households. In response to a (permanent) 
reduction in housing prices, it is reasonable to presume that households 
desire to consume some additional quantity of housing services. Alterna- 
tively, the ”disequilibrium” between current and desired housing ser- 
vices is increased when the price reduction is offered. Additional con- 
sumption implies moving, and only when the capitalized utility difference 
between current and desired housing consumption exceeds the utility 
costs of moving will an adjustment in consumption be made. Even then, 
there is likely to be some time lag before any adjustment  is actually 
observed.  The  percent-of-rent  experiment  provides  information  on 
households  at  four points  in  time  during twenty-four months  of  ex- 
perimental treatment. Is it reasonable to presume that the entire effect of 
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tabs or the more elaborate analyses of  Friedman and Weinberg (1978) 
suggest a price elasticity on the order of -  0.2.  Is it reasonable to estimate 
the dynamic response  pattern and  the long-run  price  responsiveness 
simultaneously?  If  it  is,  then  the simple stock-adjustment  model  of 
Hanushek and Quigley (1980) yields estimates that are, in the long run, 
two to three times larger numerically. 
This is not to argue that one or the other of these results is preferred on 
methodological grounds. The different results do  indicate, however, that 
the interpretation of  the experimental “facts” is heavily dependent upon 
a model of the short-run dynamics of the market. With only a short time 
series and with at most only four observations on each individual house- 
hold, it is difficult to estimate the asymptote of  any assumed dynamic 
adjustment pattern with  confidence.  In fact, it  does not  take a very 
complex assumption about market dynamics to render the problem logi- 
cally intractable. 
The same difficulties  in  interpretation apply  to each  of  the other 
treatment groups in the experiments. 
The Constrained Households 
Rosen’s paper emphasizes the utility of  the experimental evidence to 
estimate three parameters familiar to economists: a price and income 
elasticity of demand and a price elasticity of supply. 
If  households are highly sensitive to housing-price incomes in their 
consumption choices, a national percent-of-rent (housing-gap) program 
would  increase  the housing  consumption  of  selected  households.  If 
households are relatively insensitive to prices and incomes, either pro- 
gram would reduce the high “rent burdens” that they face. 
Clearly much of the popular and political appeal  of housing allowances 
focuses  on the provision  of  inducements  to households to consume 
“adequate” housing.  Indeed, as Rosen  notes,  it  is unlikely  that  any 
percent-of-rent  program would be implemented  nationally-landlord- 
tenant collusion would then be pr~fitable.~ 
Concerns about adequate housing (whether they arise from so-called 
externalities or simply paternalism)  are reflected in the design of  the 
HASE and HADE programs. All of the payments offered in the supply 
experiment were conditional upon verification that the recipient house- 
hold was living in “adequate” housing, where adequate is defined pro- 
grammatically. For five of  the HADE treatment groups, housing-gap 
(i.e., negative-income-tax) payments were conditinal upon similar verifi- 
cation (but according to slightly different program definitions); six other 
HADE  treatment groups offered payments conditional upon some mini- 
5. It should be noted, however, that similar incentives exist in the food stamp program. 
In addition, there was no evidence of  collusion among the eight hundred households and 
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mum rental expenditure. Overall 53 percent of the experimental house- 
holds at both HADE  sites waere assigned to treatments where subsidies 
were conditional upon verification of the physical condition of dwellings 
or minimum rental payments; 41 percent were assigned to unconstrained 
percent-of-rent treatments and only 6 percent to unconstrained-housing- 
gap treatments (see Allen, Fitts, and Glatt 1981). 
The Ambiguous Evidence 
In the absence of very rich models of consumer behavior (and, as noted 
below, in the presence of  very small sample sizes), it is difficult to draw 
strong inferences  from the housing-gap experiments where payments 
were tied to verification of  physical standards. 
For those  households  offered transfers subject  to minimum  rental 
payments,  the sample  sizes,  after  two  years of  the experiment,  are 
reasonably  large.  Using  comparisons  with  households  in  the control 
group,  the  HADE  researchers  estimate  the  effect  of  transfers- 
conditional-upon-rent- payments upon household rental expenditures. 
Further, in a series of  complex analyses (Friedman and Weinberg 1979, 
chapter 6), they conclude that recipients of  these transfers may have 
shopped less efficiently for housing services than control households. 
The analysis of  households receiving housing-gap transfers, according 
to different schedules, conditional upon the physical characteristics of 
their housing, is much more problematic.h  In part, the HADE analysis is 
constrained by small sample sizes and low participation rates. For exam- 
ple, in Pittsburgh, 87 households in the minimum-standards treatment 
group met those standards after two years. However, 38 of those house- 
holds met the standards initially, leaving 49 who were induced to meet the 
standards, at least in part, by the experimental payment offer. However, 
these offers were  made under five different  payment  schedules. The 
difference  in  payments  between  the  least-generous  and  the  most- 
generous payment schedule is 183 percent. 
More important than small numbers in interpreting the HADE analy- 
sis is the behavioral reason for small samples of  program  participants 
under the constrained treatment groups. Many of  the comparisons re- 
ported  are between participants and control households,  or between 
moving households and movers in the control group. Presumably the 
analytical samples are selected on the basis of stronger tastes for housing 
consumption. This selectivity bias is clearly recognized by the research- 
ers, and heroic efforts are  made’to “triangulate” on the “true” treatment 
effects  by presenting parameter estimates for many different subsamples 
of  households. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to  interpret these estimates in the absence of 
a unified theory of  household participation and household consumption. 
6. This issue is discussed in detail in Hanushek and Quigley (1981). 82  Harvey S. Rosen 
Some Behavioral Models 
For 53 percent  of  the households in the HADE treatment groups, 
payment offers were tied to specific adjustments in housing consump- 
tion-adjustments  that had  not been made in the absence of  the ex- 
perimental bribe.  It is clear  that in  many circumstances the rational 
household may maximize its welfare by declining the payment and its 
associated strings. Unfortunately, neither Rosen’s discussion nor any of 
the analyses of the constrained households pays much attention to the 
welfare economics of  the choice problem solved by these low-income 
households. In response to the experimental offer, households choose 
program participation and levels of  housing consumption; an economic 
model of  behavior must address jointly the program-participation deci- 
sion and the housing-consumption decision of those invited to enroll in 
the constrained treatment groups. 
Each of the tied offers presents the potential recipient with a distorted 
and more complex opportunity set or budget constraint. If  it is assumed 
that there exists a single index of housing services and that initial housing 
prices  are constant  in  the market, then the minimum-rent treatment 
groups face a linear, but discontinuous budget constraint. If  it is assumed 
that separate indexes exist for “housing-standards goods”  and “other 
housing goods,” and that initial prices are constant, then the minimum- 
standards treatment groups face a budget plane (in their choice of stan- 
dards, other housing goods, and nonhousing goods) that is discontinuous. 
It is clear, moreover, that in the absence of  these convenient assump- 
tions, the budget constraint need not be linear in its traces; but it surely is 
discontinuous. 
A microeconomic model of the participation and housing-consumption 
decision must use market information somehow to trace the shape of the 
indifference curve between housing and nonhousing goods or between 
standards components, other housing, and nonhousing goods. 
Hausman and Wise (1980) have analyzed the choice problem when 
households face a budget constraint that may be nonlinear and discon- 
tinuous, but that can be represented by pricewise continuous functions; 
their methodology has been applied to  the data from the HADE  percent- 
of-rent households gathered after one year of  experimental treatment. 
This methodology estimates the curvature of  utility functions between 
“housing services” and other goods from the revealed participation and 
consumption decisions of  the experimental households. 
Assume a single linear price index of housing services, normalized to a 
value of one, so that rental expenditures R measure service consumption. 
Assume that household preferences can be represented by: 83  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
where Y is income and p is a function of  household sociodemographic 
characteristics X  and a random error n, i.e., 
(2)  p=m+n. 
If  income is not a determinant of  p, then equation (1) is merely Cobb- 
Douglas in two goods. 
(3 
where E is a stochastic error. 
Consider a household assigned to the minimum-rent treatment, i.e., a 
household i offered a cash transfer A conditional upon rental expendi- 
tures of  R*. 
The household  will  accept the transfer  and will  participate  in the 
program if  its taste for housing is large enough, that is, if  its pi is greater 
than the highest value, p, at which it would be indifferent. 
More generally, maximizing utility implies 
R = pY + E = (X6)  Y + nY +  E 
(4)  (yi  + A -  R*)I-Pi R*Pi>(yi -  R)l-Pi RPi, pi>p, 
Participating households will have housing expenditures of 
(5)  R=pi  Yi+ri>R*. 
Analogously, a household will decline the transfer and will not partici- 
pate if  its taste pi is less than the smallest value, -  p, at which it would be 
indifferent. 
(6) 
Nonparticipants incur housing expenditures of 
(7)  R=pi  Yi+ei<R*. 
Thus for a sample of househoids in the minimum-rent treatment group, 
the likelihood function for the rental expenditures observed depends 
upon  ei and  pi  (for example, we  will  observe R > R* if  pi  > p and 
Assumptions about the distribution of  ei and about the distribution of 
pi permit  the function to be maximized and the parameters 6 to be 
estimated. 
Estimates of 6 indicate the distribution of  housing preferences across 
sociodemographic groups and the full response of individual households 
to the minimum-rent treatment. 
The procedure is general enough to address choices made in response 
to any discontinuous monotonic budget constraint regardless of its shape. 
Indeed, it was first applied to the nonlinear case (Burtless and Hausman 
1978). 
(Yi -  R)l-PjRPi>(Yi  + A -  R*)l-Pi R@i, pi<&. 
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The Hausman-Wise  model  may  not  be appropriate, however,  for 
analyzing the responses to treatments tied to consumption of  housing 
standards. At least two other approaches may be employed to estimate 
the curvature of  indifference surfaces and hence to analyze jointly parti- 
cipation and consumption decisions. The first emphasizes the nonlinear- 
ity of prices for continuous-housing attributes. The second, and better 
known, emphasizes the discrete nature of  housing choices. 
First, assume that the rn characteristics of  housing standards (2)  and 
the n other housing characteristics  (H)  are priced jointly according to 
some hedonic rule, 
(8)  R =  f(H,Z) , 
Where Hand 2  are continuous and differentiable. Households of income 
Yare assumed to have preferences over these components of housing as 
well as other goods, X,  whose price is normalized to one. 
Maximizing utility 
(9) 
(10)  Y =f(H,Z)  + x, 
u = g(H,Z,Y -  R)  , 
subject to the nonlinear budget constraint 
means that housing prices are jointly chosen with housing commodities. 
Nevertheless, utility maximization implies a set of  i = 1,2, . . . ,  rn + n 
first-order conditions of  the form 
(11)  fi(H,Z)  = Ui(H,  z,  Y -  R) 
Joint estimation of the set of  first-order conditions is possible as long asf 
is nonlinear and exogenous, at least for many forms of  the utility func- 
tion. Empirically, estimation  may  proceed  by  determining  the para- 
meters of  the hedonic function, using Box-Cox or  some other best-fitting 
procedure. The derivatives of  the estimated function, evaluated at the 
(H,Z) chosen by each individual, become the dependent variables in the 
estimation  of  the parameters of  utility   function^.^  These parameters 
would permit inferences to be drawn about the participation and con- 
sumption decisions of  households offered tied subsidies. 
The second technique would estimate the parameters of a stochastic 
utility function of the form 
(12)  u =  g(H,Z,  Y -  R)  +  E . 
These parameters could be estimated directly from observations on the 
dwelling unit chosen by each household in the treatment group and on a 
7. For example, assuming the utility function is GCES (Murray 1975), Quigley (1982) 
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sample of the rejected alternatives using the general model suggested by 
McFadden (1977) .’ 
Conclusion 
Inferences about the behavior of households offered subsidies tied to 
minimum rental payments or tied to the consumption of housing meeting 
minimum standards must address the decision to participate in the pro- 
gram as well as the housing-consumption decision, given participation. 
Since  the opportunity  sets of  experimental subjects are distorted  in 
peculiar ways by these treatments, an analytical technique that investi- 
gates the curvature of  indifference surfaces seems necessary. Using some- 
what different assumptions, the three strategies outlined above integrate 
the consumption and participation  decision. 
The first strategy has been employed by Hausman and Wise to analyze 
the minimum-rent households.  The second strategy was discussed by 
Murray (1978) in the context of housing allowances. The third strategy is, 
in principle, a straightforward application of models successfully applied 
in other markets. 
It should be noted, however, that even if the form of the utility function 
were known with certainty (on the basis of these or other investigations), 
the short duration of the experiment would still make inferences about 
the “long run” problematic. The effect of  long-term tied subsidies upon 
the long-term consumption behavior of  low-income households is dif- 
ficult to infer from a very short time series. 
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Comment  Gregory K. Ingram 
In his paper Harvey Rosen focuses on whether or not experimental data 
from the housing-allowance experiments have helped investigators re- 
solve a number of  analytic and empirical difficulties that plague the 
analysis of both the supply and demand sides of the housing market. He 
concludes that the experimental data have not been particularly helpful. 
His is a good summary of these issues, and I concur with his views. Rather 
than review his points directly, I shall take an approach, which I hope will 
be complementary to his, that focuses on a slightly different question: 
What have we learned from the housing-allowance experiments that can 
help us predict what the costs and effects of a full-scale national housing- 
allowance program would be, and could we  have learned these things 
from nonexperimental data? The discussion of this question is organized 
around three subheadings: What would a national program cost? How 
would  it  affect  housing  consumption?  How  would  it  affect housing 
markets? 
Program Cost 
The total cost of  a national housing-allowance program would be one 
of  the crucial determinants of  its adoption. Calculating these costs re- 
quires three pieces of information: the transfer payment and administra- 
tive cost per type of eligible household; the participation rate of each type 
of  eligible household; and the total number  of  each type of  eligible 
household (Khadduri and Struyk 1980). The payment for each type of 
eligible household would depend on the payment formula, household 
characteristics, and perhaps local market parameters. Data from hous- 
ing-allowance experiments would not be particularly relevant. The ex- 
periments also provide estimates of  administrative costs; these could 
arguably have come from nonexperimental sources. 
The participation rate of households in the program, which is a crucial 
determinant of program costs, would be heavily dependent on data from 
the experiments. The experiments have revealed that the participation 
rates of  eligible households in the experimental program were much 
lower (at 30 to 50 percent) than those of the AFDC programs (around 80 
percent) that seemed to have been used as guidelines for the design of the 
housing-allowance experiments. Average participation rates for renters 
were 27 percent for the demand experiments, 42 percent for the supply 
experiments, and 53 percent for the administrative agency experiments, 
while they were 33 percent for owners in the supply experiment (Struyk 
and Bendick 1981, chap. 4). In fact, as Rosen states, these unexpectedly 
Gregory K. Ingram is director, development  research department, the World Bank, 
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low participation rates have been one of  the factors that have compro- 
mised the success of  the supply experiments. The experiments suggest 
that the variation in participation rates depends on several factors includ- 
ing  the magnitude  of  benefits  offered to eligible households  (higher 
benefits raise participation); the level of  standards used to inspect and 
approve  dwelling  units  (stricter  standards lower  participation);  the 
amount of  “outreach” used (more promotion increases participation); 
tenure (owners participate  less than  renters); and market conditions 
(tighter markets may have lower participation). Although these factors 
seem to affect participation,  it is not clear that the experiments have 
produced reliable models that can be used to predict participation rates as 
a function of the foregoing factors. Moreover,  if a “treatment” other than 
one  used in the experiments were to be evaluated, some kind of model or 
interpolation procedure would have to be used to predict participation 
rates. 
Could we have learned about participation rates using nonexperimen- 
tal data? Certainly many persons involved in designing the experiments 
were surprised at the low participation rates. Perhaps the experimental 
rates are biased downward. It is possible to argue that the true participa- 
tion  rates  of  a  national  program  would  be  higher  than  those  ex- 
perimentally observed simply due to the temporary nature of the experi- 
ments. However, the results of the supply experiment, with its ten-year 
pay-out period, seem to mitigate this objection. A national program also 
might have higher  participation  rates because it would become more 
widely known than the experiments did, and more networks for “diffu- 
sion”  of  the program  might  become operative.  Hence, although the 
participation rates from the experiments may be lower bounds for true 
rates, participation is an important determinant of total program costs 
that would be difficult to learn about without an experiment. 
The total number of eligible households of each type, the last determi- 
nant of  costs, might  not  be independent  of  the design  of  a housing- 
allowance  program. It is  possible  that  a  housing-allowance  program 
might alter rates of household formation or dissolution. For example, a 
housing-allowance  program  might  encourage  the  formation  of  low- 
income,  one-person  households and thereby  increase the number  of 
eligible households. The housing-allowance experiments cast no light on 
this matter. Empirical studies, however, tend to find only weak relations 
between housing-market conditions and household formation (Williams 
1978). 
Housing Consumption 
Two major formulas, the housing-gap and percent-of-rent specifica- 
tions, were tested in the housing-allowance experiments, but it appears 
that the income-gap formula would be the most likely one to be incorpo- 89  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
rated into a national housing-allowance program. Although the demand 
experiments found no evidence for it, apparently there is  a lingering 
suspicion that a percent-of-rent formula in a national program would be a 
prime  candidate for  fraudulent  cooperation  between  landlords  and 
tenants: it is feared that landlords would raise rents and split additional 
allowance payments with tenants (Struyk and Bendick 1981,175). If the 
income-gap formula  is  the prime  candidate  policy,  then the income 
elasticity of the demand for housing is the prime behavioral parameter of 
interest. This parameter has been widely estimated using cross-sectional 
data,  and it does not appear that the housing-allowance experiments were 
necessary for its estimation. 
The relatively low, income elasticities of  demand obtained from the 
housing-allowance experiments are plausible and consistent with those 
obtained from other studies.  They  are certainly  at the low  range of 
cross-sectional estimates, but this is believable given the short time frame 
of the demand experiments and the low income levels of participants and 
control groups. Some analysts disagree with this characterization of  the 
elasticities, and they believe that the “true” elasticities are higher. They 
argue that slow speeds of adjustment, model specification, and the omis- 
sion of tenure change are biasing downward the experimental results 
(Hanushek and Quigley  1979). Change in tenure was possible in the 
supply experiments, but only about 1  percent of  the participating house- 
holds changed tenure (Struyk and Bendick 198l), 292). Many of these 
arguments are doubtless applicable to procedures used with traditional 
household survey data. In any case, it seems to me that the housing- 
allowance  experiments  were  not  necessary  for the estimation  of  the 
required income-elasticity parameters. 
As Rosen points out in his paper, data from the housing-allowance 
experiments do have a comparative advantage in the estimation of  price 
elasticities because prices are not observed directly in housing markets. If 
a housing-gap formula were used in a national program, however, the 
price elasticity would be relevant only if  housing prices changed due to 
the program. This price change would then have a secondary impact on 
housing consumption. Hence the price-elasticity estimates are interesting 
but not  necessarily relevant to the consumption effects of  a national 
housing program. 
In addition to providing information about overall housing consump- 
tion parameters, several additional insights were gained about the con- 
sumption and choice behavior of  households in housing markets and the 
usefulness  of  certain  analytic  approaches.  Three of  these  are worth 
mentioning here. 
First, several versions of  the demand experiment and all of the supply 
and administrative-agency  experiments  required  participating  house- 
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standards.  Where dwelling units failed these standards,  the units could be 
upgraded or the household could move. Whichever response was used by 
a household, it appears that they adjusted their dwelling unit so that it 
passed the specific constraints imposed. There was usually no significant 
improvement beyond that mandated by the standards.  Given this type of 
narrow and specific meeting of required standards, it appears that the 
standards used would be significant determinants of the outcomes asso- 
ciated with a national housing-allowance program. In particular, much 
thought  needs to be given  to the setting of  standards in  a  national 
program. This specificity of  response is a significant result that apparently 
could only have come from the experiments. 
Second, a great deal of data were collected about household behavior 
in housing markets in the course of  the demand experiments, and this 
data has been used to analyze empirically the search behavior exhibited 
by households in housing markets. It appears, for example, that search 
behavior does pay off in terms of  finding dwellings with particular attri- 
butes desired by the households or  in terms of finding dwellings that may 
be bargains  (Dunson 1979). This analysis of  search  behavior has not 
exploited the experimental nature of the data, however, and in principle 
could  have  been done with  traditional  survey  data that interviewed 
households during or just before their household moves. The existence of 
the allowance experiments obviously make the identification of  this time 
interval straightforward. 
Third, a number of  results of  the housing-allowance experiments were 
obtained by using hedonic indexes to control for variations in the price or 
quantity of  housing. For example, it has been reported that households 
faced  with  minimum-rent  standards tended to pay  more per unit  of 
housing quantity than households faced with  minimum physical stan- 
dards (Struyk and Bendick 1981, 140-43). Results of  this type are based 
on hedonic indexes estimated  for Phoenix  and  Pittsburgh.  Although 
Rosen has already mentioned the shortcomings of  these indexes in the 
analysis of housing-market outcomes,  it is worth pointing out the particu- 
lar  properties  of the Pittsburgh and Phoenix indexes. Using excellent data 
and sufficient resources for experimentation with alternative specifica- 
tions, the hedonic equations for Pittsburgh and Phoenix had R2  of 0.66 
and 0.80, respectively (Merrill 1977). These are reasonably high levels of 
explanatory power.  However, an analysis of  the residuals from these 
equations indicates that the average absolute magnitude of the residuals 
was 22 percent of the average rent paid in Pittsburgh and 20 percent of  the 
average rent paid in Phoenix (Dunson 1979, 208). Since many of  the 
calculations done on price and quantity variation employ residuals from 
these hendonic equations, the large magnitude of the residuals is troub- 
ling. It suggests that there is a specification problem with the underlying 
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housing markets,  even with  the best  data  one could hope  for. The 
magnitudes of the Pittsburgh and Phoenix residuals do not give one cause 
to be optimistic about the use of  hedonic indexes to measure the small 
changes in price or quantity of the sort associated with the experiments. 
Again, experimental data was not necessary to demonstrate this. 
Market Effects 
The supply experiments tested for market-wide effects in two urban 
areas using  a housing-gap-allowance formula. Since the housing-gap 
formula works through the income elasticity of demand, which is low, in 
combination with a low participation rate, the supply experiments in- 
creased housing demand very little. As a consequence, there has been no 
measurable market-wide effect of  the supply experiment. This result is 
significant because one of  the major objections to a national housing- 
allowance program has been its possible inflationary consequences. Do 
we really want to believe that  a national housing-allowance program 
would have a similarly small market-wide effect? To answer this ques- 
tion, it is useful to do some simple sensitivity analyses on major-program 
parameters. 
A number of  different income limits have been used in the supply, 
demand, and administration-agency experiments carried out, but they all 
seem to yield an income-level cutoff that equals about one-half of median 
household income. About 20 percent of  households typically have in- 
comes below this level. In both the demand and supply experiments 
about one-half of  income-eligible households enrolled in the program. 
Not all of those who enrolled decided to become participants. As noted 
earlier, in the demand experiment 27 percent of  income-eligible house- 
holds participated while in the supply experiments the participation rate 
was 42 percent for renters and 33 percent for owners. Thus participants 
ranged from about 6 percent to 8 percent of all households. Moreover, of 
those who participated, it is reported that about three-fourths stayed in 
their pre-enrollment dwellings (Struyk and Bendick 1981,223). Hence, 
from 1.5 to 2 percent of all households moved because of, or in conjunc- 
tion with, their participation in the experiment. This is not a large fraction 
of the roughly 20 percent of  households that move each year. Using the 
percentage of all households whose moves are associated with allowances 
to proxy-demand  increases suggests that slightly higher participation 
rates would not have much of  an impact on market-wide housing-market 
outcomes. However, market-wide impacts might be observed if the per- 
cent of all households eligible for allowances  was increased markedly, say 
from 20 percent to 40 percent. 
One final number also merits reporting: three-fourths of those house- 
holds whose original dwelling unit failed inspection in the demand experi- 
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by moving (Struyk and Bendick 1981, 109). Given that three-fourths of 
participants stayed in their pre-enrollment dwelling unit, this implies that 
the majority of households participating in the demand experiments had 
pre-enrollment  dwellings  that  passed  the  standards. The percent  of 
households in the supply experiments that met the standards by moving 
after first failing the standards was much smaller, about 25 percent, but 
still over half  of  the participants in  the supply experiments had pre- 
enrollment units that met the standards. Given this fact, it is not surpris- 
ing that the demand increase stimulated by the housing-allowance experi- 
ments-and  particularly  the three-year  demand experiment-was  not 
large. 
The basic behavior pattern implicit in these numbers seems to be as 
follows; households living in units that pass the minimum standards are 
likely to participate in the program and to stay in their original units. 
Households living in units that fail the standards  originally are much less 
likely to participate in the program; those who do  participate may move, 
especially if  they are renters. Since the overall moving rates of  participat- 
ing households are similar to the moving rates of control households, and 
adjustments are made in housing bundles that narrowly and specifically 
meet the standards, it  seems reasonable  to conclude  that a  national 
housing-allowance program similar to the one tested in the experiments 
would not have significant market-wide effects. This conclusion depends 
heavily on the patterns of  household behavior (e.g., participation, mobil- 
ity, adjustment to standards) revealed by the experiments, and it would 
be difficult to characterize this behavior without the experimental data. 
However, most of  the relevant behavior was observed in the demand 
experiments.  We may yet  learn something about specific landlord or 
supplier behavior from the supply experiments, but it will be difficult. For 
example, only 217 of  the 3,720 monitored dwellings in Green Bay are 
occupied by  program participants (Struyk and Bendick 1981, 301). 
Conclusion 
I agree with Rosen’s view that the experimental data arising from the 
housing-allowance experiments have not helped us to solve many of the 
problems of measurement that underly the analysis of housing markets. 
However, I also believe that some of the experimental findings are crucial 
if we are to evaluate the case for a national housing-allowance program. 
The  information on participation rates and the specific response of house- 
holds to minimum standards are two results important to the assessment 
of a national program. Both would be difficult to obtain using traditional 
household interview data. 
Does this mean that the housing-allowance experiments were worth- 
while? The cost of the experiments, shown in table C2.1, are very high. 
So high, in fact, that one is forced to think there must be a better way to 93  Housing Behavior and the Experimental Housing-Allowance Program 
Table C2.1  Estimated Cost of Housing-Allowance Experiment (in millions) 
Household  Adminis-  Research and 
Experiment  Payments  tration  Monitoring  Total 
Demand  $  3.6  $  2.0  $25.6  $  31.2 
Supply  42.5  18.5  41.7  102.7 
Administrative 
Agency  9.8  3.4  9.2  22.4 
Overall design 
and analysis  0.  0.  6.8  6.8 
TOTAL  $55.9  $23.9  $83.3  $163.3 
Source: Struyk and Bendick (1981,297). Estimates by HUD, October (1979), of  projected 
total costs. 
learn what must be learned-or at least a cheaper experiment. With the 
benefit of  hindsight  (a crucial preamble), there was a cheaper experi- 
ment: the housing-allowance  experiments without  the supply experi- 
ment. But I do not believe there is a better way to learn what must be 
learned. Social experiments clearly have a place in the social scientist’s 
tool kit. 
Some would  use  the housing-allowance  experiments  to argue  this 
conclusion more forcefully. First, they would state that a social experi- 
ment is much more credible to a decision maker (read congressman) than 
are empirically estimated equations or a simulation model. Second,  they 
would invoke what I call the “Christopher Columbus principle of  attribu- 
tion” (one is judged by one’s findings, not by success in discovering what 
was originally set out for), and claim that one year’s savings from the 
improvements in administrative efficiency of  HUD’s existing programs 
stemming from results of the housing-allowance experiments will pay for 
the experiments (Struyk and Bendick 1981, 308). Finally, they would 
dispeal fears about fundamental flaws in social experiments by pointing 
out that the “Hawthorne effect,” the hypothesis that people alter their 
behavior when under study, no longer has a strong empirical base. A new 
analysis (Lagerfeld 1979; Franke and Kaul 1978) of  the original data 
collected  at Western Electric’s Hawthorne plant in Chicago does not 
support the study’s original findings. 
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